A contest over natural resources?

New Zealand’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) covers over 4 million square kilometres. This makes it one of the largest EEZs in the world—typically ranked as the fourth or fifth largest globally, and about 15 times the size of New Zealand’s land area.  One possible risk for New Zealand  is that China would decide to enter that zone because it wanted to forcibly expropriate New Zealand’s natural resources .  If it could, New Zealand would have to resist that happening.

As long ago as 2018, in a commentary on this subject, Australia’s Lowy Institute said that the impact of Chinese fishing has important strategic consequences for Australia in several ways.  One was that there was a good chance that fishing would  become a key locus of disputes and incidents involving China. It was observed that the collapse in fish stocks due to overfishing could have implications for the region.  In their opinion,  it was likely that bigger fishing fleets chasing declining stocks would make fishing an ever more contested activity.  In that writer’s view, competition over access to fisheries could  put states under greater pressure to assert claims and to police their national exclusive economic zones (EEZ).

The Lowy Institute view seems at least plausible and applicable to New Zealand.  In the current context, a specific way a problem could come about would be if Chinese fishing vessels entered  the New Zealand exclusive economic zone for fisheries purposes or using deep-sea mining ships to carry out deep-sea prospecting activities within the zone. The risk from China’s fishing  fleet is both with the volume (44% of the world’s fishing is carried out by China, according to one estimate) and its world-worst illegal fishing status.  The problem could escalate if having taken such a step, China could, for example, refuse to remove its trespassing nationals, countering that the EEZ is of no legal standing.

Were this to occur, it would represent a significant violation of New Zealand’s boundaries and a direct challenge to New Zealand which would have to consider a military response. While it would have to consider a military response, that is not the same as accepting that New Zealand would have the power to effectively respond militarily. New Zealand’s ability to respond to that and other risks is a central question addressed in this article and is an issue for subsequent discussion.

A further type of risk-generating occurrence would be China engaging in the same sort of harmful environmental or economic practices in the South-west Pacific Ocean region but outside New Zealand’s New Zealand’s EEZ.  Again, this could take the form of seabed mining or excessive and illegal fishing operations. An example that could open the door to just such significant environmental harm is the recent Chinese agreement with the Cook Islands which would provide a maritime base there. A likely consequence of that accord is that fishing would intensify.    While the exact pattern of how a  dispute of this kind could escalate, the end result could be that New Zealand considered that the end result was harmful to its interests.  In the event of this kind arising, because it would take place in international waters, New Zealand’s interests could be adversely affected but the case for it taking action against the Chinese fleet would be weak.

In the case of New Zealand, there is an additional sensitivity growing out of China’s increasing  activities  in the Antarctic, which include research and fishing, particularly for krill. Scientists have justified concerns that Chinese fleets are already harvesting unsustainable levels of krill from the southern waters. This may be a prelude to future destructive resource extraction, challenging the Antarctic Treaty’s principles and damaging Southern Ocean life chains.  This activity  poses the risk of long-term harm in oceans both with and outside New Zealand’s EEZ. But  as in the case of other activities  outside  the EEZ, New Zealand would not have firm grounds on which to base military intervention against the vessels involved. 

While acknowledging that China likely has no intention of entering New Zealand’s EEZ, New Zealanders should not assume it will never happen simply because they believe China would not treat New Zealand in such a manner. An assumption to that effect would rest on the untested assumption that China is a good neighbour that just would not invade New Zealand. That view, however, overlooks the fact that China has historically used and is currently using force to assert its claims over disputed areas in the South China Sea to access gas, oil deposits, and fisheries. It is apparently overlooked by some that if China has done this to its neighbours in the South China Sea, why would they not do it to New Zealand if that suited their interests?

But having said that, it should be accepted that there is no evidence of an actual present activity of this kind or a present intention on China’s part in the future to appropriate New Zealand resources inside New Zealand’s EEZ. Regarding non-fishery resources, including gas and oil extraction and sea-floor mining, there could be other more conveniently located and perhaps more easily accessible resources that other South Pacific states control, which represent “low-hanging fruit” for China in this area. For example, it apparently now has consent to enter the territorial waters of the Cook Islands to carry out seabed mining prospecting. It has also been in discussions with Kiribati about mining in areas that the state controls.

It is therefore a matter of strategic judgement whether China in the future would ever come south into New Zealand’s EEZ to exploit resources in the form of seabed mining or fisheries, for example, without consent. It would not be correct to conclude that China’s willingness to enter other nations’ waters and contest their resources is, by itself, sufficient grounds for assuming that New Zealand’s EEZ is at risk. However, China’s willingness to act along the lines described is not the sole determining factor.  It would also have to be shown, first, that it was likely that China would calculate that it would obtain some net benefit from that type of action and, second, that it had the ability to carry out the particular detrimental activity. An initiative of this kind would not be entirely without risk from China’s point of view. While there may not be any substantial military risk currently that could change but the comment is thought to correctly summarize risk as at the present time.

But China by undertaking actions of that kind would be putting at risk its standing and reputation in the South Pacific. This could be deter it at a stage when it is still trying to foster its increasing presence in the South Pacific. A time may arrive when it determines that it has achieved what it set out to do in that area and from that point on the question of whether it is viewed as an aggressive adventure by South Pacific states might be a matter of indifference to it. Of course, its reputation in the wider world would be adversely impacted by conducting itself in the ways that have just been discussed. It is difficult to know what China’s calculation about the weight it should attach to such a negative outcome would be factored into its thinking. 

Overall,  New Zealand may decide that there is insufficient evidence for viewing the type of event discussed in this part as a present risk or one that is likely to occur in the nmedium future. But because this type of risk is a plausiible one, it should be kept under review in future in case a change of circumstances occurs that would require changes to New Zealand’s military plans .

Interference with New Zealand trade routes

Another form of risk is that China could impose pressure on New Zealand by interfering with its trade routes. This might be used as a kind of pressure to obtain something from New Zealand or to deter New Zealand from doing something that China would see as being contrary to its interests.

An example of an important sea route is that connecting New Zealand to the globally significant container port of Port Klang (PK), Malaysia. That base is a common and important transshipment and destination port for New Zealand imports and exports, ensuring NZ goods regularly pass through its terminals on their way to and from global markets. The sea distance from Auckland to PK is approximately 9400 km.

The question of how New Zealand can secure this and other important trading routes is considered in a subsequent article. One part of that analysis which will be anticipated at this point is that there would be, in principle, no reason why any enemy of New Zealand, including China, could not blockade merchant ships at any point between their departure port in New Zealand and their destination port in the region. This suggests that the potential area for interception could be quite extensive. A tactic that an aggressor could adopt is that rather than seeking out ships on the high seas at a part way point on their journey, it could wait until they were approaching their destination; that is, in the case of our example, as they got closer to PK. This tactic would allow the intercepting naval force to reduce their search area.  It would also mean that the location of these Chinese actions would be so far distant from New Zealand that it would make it hard to carry out any military response originating from New Zealand.

Conclusion

A following article will focus more closely on the sequence or path that the unfolding of a military threat to New Zealand might take. The issues to be discussed will include whether any future war, like past ones, would be fought at a distance from New Zealand, or whether it could be on New Zealand’s home territory.

The next article will also consider what steps New Zealand can take, both militarily and otherwise, to respond to these threats.